DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, Texas -- What leaders can learn from the intercontinental ballistic missile test compromise at Malmstrom Air Force Base, Mont.
As a leader, how can I create a culture ripe for ethical failure? If possible, can I create a culture that will ruin my career and subject myself and my subordinates to negative administrative actions or criminal liability? Although it is impossible to speak with metaphysical certainty, it is fair to assume that few leaders ask themselves these questions. Still, the recipe for disaster can give some helpful pointers for the road to success; knowing about the landmines makes charting the journey easier. As an autopsy of an ethical failure, the command directed investigation of Malmstrom's test compromise reveals some of the traps that can lead to a culture vulnerable to ethical failure.
The Malmstrom test compromise involved officers sharing answers for monthly ICBM combat crew knowledge tests with other officers who had yet to take the tests. An Air Force Office of Special Investigations investigation uncovered evidence that implicated 98 officers in the potential compromise of test information. AFOSI retained ten of the cases because they involved the potential compromise of classified material. The remaining 88 cases, along with the training and testing culture and leadership environment, were subjects of a command directed investigation. The CDI determined that the individual acts that compromised the tests were influenced in part by Air Force, Air Force Global Strike Command and 20th Air Force organizational impacts on training and testing culture. Also, although there is no evidence that the 341st Missile Wing leadership condoned or had specific knowledge about the sharing of monthly knowledge test material, the CDI concluded leadership actions in the 341st Operations Group played a role in its occurrence. The CDI report is available at
http://www.foia.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-140327-017.pdf. It has been redacted to comply with the applicable Freedom of Information Act exemptions, but much of the 268 page report is un-redacted.
From the CDI's findings and conclusions, six problem characteristics were identified as playing a role in the culture.
- Leaders emphasized their desire for an unrealistic and unobtainable "zero defect" culture, where "perfection is the standard"
Instead of attempting to stamp out all error through micromanagement and unrelenting testing and evaluation, leaders should adopt a credible nonpunitive policy toward error and demonstrate a commitment to taking action to reduce conditions which are prone to create errors. If you can't accept bad news, eventually you will only receive good news. Unfortunately, the bad news is still out there.
- Emphasis on near-continuous inspection and evaluation made individuals numb to training but they feared the tests because of the severe consequences of failure
Members saw no incentive for self-evaluation and self-identification of their errors during training. When conducting honest self-evaluation results in negative treatment, self-evaluations are bound to become less complete, if not dishonest. At the same time, if the test score is seen as the be-all and end-all for career advancement, the unhealthy focus will likely result in unhealthy efforts to achieve the highest possible score.
- Leaders restricted all decision making authority to themselves leaving their subordinates feeling underused and undervalued
Aggressive centralized oversight and the inspection/testing regimes created a cyclical record of inspection success and failure within 20th AF missile wings and showed that such an approach is not sustainable. Short-term results shouldn't be rewarded at the expense of long-term unit health and leader development. Even worse, the following generation of leaders will likely adopt an even harsher approach following the established example--increasing the alienation and dissatisfaction of subordinates.
- The gap between leadership and crews became an "us-against-them" culture
Although fostering teamwork is usually seen as a positive leadership quality, when it allegedly unites 98 officers in a cheating scandal, it is decidedly less so. The members perceived that their primary loyalty was to each other instead of to the organization and felt responsible that they survive as a group.
- A "perverse incentive structure" minimized the incentive to perform well in the field, while maximizing the incentive to perform well on classroom tests
Leaders need to be aware of the behavior that they are incentivizing. If there's no reward for real world accomplishment, you are likely to see lessened real-world efforts.
- Leadership failed to articulate clear guidance on academic integrity and testing expectations
You probably wouldn't be able to dissuade all ethical misconduct even if you talked non-stop about ethics, character and integrity. However, as a leader or a supervisor at any level, it is crucial that you clearly lay out your expectations and live by them yourself.
Now that you are aware of the six problem characteristics identified in the Malmstrom CDI, you have an opportunity to avoid these landmines in your own work environment. Leaders play a pivotal role in establishing the ethical culture. As a judge advocate general, I have a piece of paper that appoints me as an ethics counselor, but all leaders have ethics counselor duties; they might not be as formally appointed, but the duties are just as real. What ethics culture are you creating?